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Abstract
This paper addresses a class of network games played by dynamic agents using their outputs. Unlike most existing related works,
the Nash equilibrium in this work is defined by functions of agent outputs instead of full agent states, which allows the agents to
have more general and heterogeneous dynamics and maintain some privacy of their local states. The concerned network game is
formulated with agents modeled by uncertain linear systems subject to external disturbances. The cost function of each agent is
a linear quadratic function depending on the outputs of its own and its neighbors in the underlying graph. The main challenge
stemming from this game formulation is that merely driving the agent outputs to the Nash equilibrium does not guarantee the
stability of the agent dynamics. Using local output and the outputs from the neighbors of each agent, we aim at designing game
strategies that achieve output Nash equilibrium seeking and stabilization of the closed-loop dynamics. Particularly, when each
agents knows how the actions of its neighbors affect its cost function, a game strategy is developed for network games with digraph
topology. When each agent is also allowed to exchange part of its compensator state, a distributed strategy can be designed for
networks with connected undirected graphs or connected digraphs.
Keywords: Game theory; Nash equilibrium; distributed control; linear networks control; disturbance rejection.
1. Introduction
Game theory has various applications to the control of multi-
agent systems including smart grids, optical networks, and mo-
bile sensor networks; see for example, Wang et al. (2014);
Stankovic´ et al. (2012); Pavel (2006). In these applications,
the agents try to minimize local cost functions that depend on
actions of their own and other players. The aim of the game
is often set to seek a Nash Equilibrium (NE), i.e., no agent can
gain by unilaterally changing its strategy. As far as we know,
all NE seeking problems in literature use full agent states as de-
cision variables and the sole purpose of the game strategy is to
drive all the components of each agent state to the NE. These
game theoretic problems have undesirable characters including
the lack of privacy among agents and the restrictions on agent
dynamics. First, as full agent states are used as decision vari-
ables, each agent has to know, or in the case of limited com-
munication, observe the full states of all other agents. In this
setting, it is impossible for the agents to converge to the NE
while keeping some parts of their states unknown to the others.
Second, in most existing works, the agents do not have indepen-
dent dynamics such as in Ye and Hu (2017), or they can have
simple homogeneous dynamics such as in Romano and Pavel
(2019a). The recent work of Romano and Pavel (2019b) devel-
ops distributed NE seeking strategies for a class of heteroge-
nous linear systems and defines the NE using partial local state.
Email addresses: meichen.guo@rug.nl (Meichen Guo),
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However, the agent dynamics therein take the special form of
multi-integrators and at the defined NE, the part of the local
state that does not explicitly appear in the NE must be zero. In
summary, the existing NE seeking strategies are not applicable
to engineering problems of multi-agent systems with general
linear local dynamics. Motivated by these drawbacks in the ex-
isting works, we aim at solving an NE seeking problem such
that, (i) if part of the local agent state is not directly involved
in decision making, it can remain private from other agents; (ii)
the agents can have more general and heterogeneous dynamics.
However, it should be pointed out that this game formulation
brings a major challenge that the outputs converging to the NE
does not imply the stability of each agent. As we also assume
that the agent states are not measurable, our goal is to design
output feedback strategies that serve two purposes: stabilizing
local dynamics and driving the outputs to the NE.
One important feature of NE seeking strategies in reference
such as Lin et al. (2014); Parise et al. (2015); Koshal et al.
(2016); Salehisadaghiani and Pavel (2016); Ye and Hu (2017);
Deng and Liang (2019); De Persis and Grammatico (2019); Ro-
mano and Pavel (2019a) is that the designed strategies are dis-
tributed with respect to the underlying communication graph.
The distributed game strategies proposed in Salehisadaghiani
and Pavel (2016); Romano and Pavel (2019a) exploit the un-
derlying communication network topology so that each agent
estimates the actions of others using information from its neigh-
bors. Nonetheless, in general games, each agent needs infor-
mation on the actions of all other agents to determine its own
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action. When the size of the network is large, the computational
burden of each agent can be extremely heavy. This limitation
leads to research on network games. In Parise et al. (2015), dis-
tributed iterative strategies are proposed for agents to converge
to an NE in network games with quadratic cost and convex
constraints. Grammatico (2018) investigates the convergence
of different equilibrium seeking proximal dynamics for multi-
agent network games with convex cost functions, time-varying
communication graph, and coupling constraints. Our work fo-
cuses on NE seeking in a class of network games, since in coop-
erative control of large networks, it can be computational dif-
ficult or unrealistic for each agent to consider the actions of
all others. Specifically, the network games considered in this
work is a class of quasi-aggregative games that each agent min-
imizes its cost function depending on its own actions and the
actions of its neighbors in the underlying network topology. If
the network is connected by a complete graph, the concerned
network games become general or aggregative games such as
the ones studied in Koshal et al. (2016); Salehisadaghiani and
Pavel (2016); Deng and Liang (2019); De Persis and Gram-
matico (2019); Romano and Pavel (2019a).
Another practical and important consideration in game theo-
retical engineering problems is the influence of external distur-
bances. In engineering applications, agents are often subject to
external disturbances, for instance, the energy consumption de-
mand in Wang et al. (2014) and wind pushing the mobile robots
in formation control in Romano and Pavel (2019a). However,
designing NE seeking strategies capable of disturbance rejec-
tion has not gained much attention other than a few works such
as Stankovic´ et al. (2012); Romano and Pavel (2019a). In this
paper, the game is formulated with agents subject to determin-
istic disturbances generated by linear exosystems, which can
be a combination of step functions and finitely many sinusoidal
functions.
For a general or aggregative game setting, some recent works
have investigated distributed NE seeking problems without or
with simply local agent dynamics. Ye and Hu (2017) considers
the NE seeking problem for agents communicating through an
undirected and connected graph. Based on a consensus protocol
and the gradient play approach, distributed NE seeking strate-
gies are proposed for games with quadratic and nonquadratic
cost functions. In the recent work Romano and Pavel (2019a),
dynamic NE seeking strategies are proposed for single and dou-
ble integrator networks subject to external disturbance modeled
by linear exosystems. The cost function of each agent is a gen-
eral convex cost function that depends on the actions of all the
agents in the network. Under the assumption that the under-
lying communication graph is undirected and connected, dy-
namic strategies can be developed to estimate the actions of
others and for the agents to converge to the unique Nash equi-
librium. Reference Deng and Liang (2019) investigates an ag-
gregative game of Euler-Lagrange systems in the presence of
uncertain parameters. The network topology is assumed to be
undirected and connected, and the agents are free of external
disturbances. As Euler-Lagrange systems are nonlinear second-
order systems, the game strategies in Deng and Liang (2019) are
proposed based on double integrators.
The distributed robust NE seeking strategies proposed in this
work are inspired by methods in linear output regulation. Com-
pared with existing works on distributed NE seeking strategy
design, this paper has the following contributions. First, we
define the NE using outputs of general linear systems as deci-
sion variables, which leads to strategies having a wider range
of engineering applications. Second, the designed NE seek-
ing strategies are capable of not only outputs convergence to
the NE but also stabilization of agent dynamics despite model
uncertainties and external disturbances. Last but not least, the
proposed strategies can be applied to networks with communi-
cation digraphs, which is not the case for most existing game
strategies including the ones in Ye and Hu (2017); Romano and
Pavel (2019a); Deng and Liang (2019).
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. The network
game formulation and some preliminaries are given in Sec-
tion 2. The distributed NE seeking strategies are developed and
analyzed in Section 3. In Section 4, simulation results of the
control of sensor networks are presented. Finally, some conclu-
sive remarks are given in Section 5.
Notations. R denotes the set of real numbers. In denotes the
n×n identity matrix. For vectors x1, . . . , xN , col(x1, . . . , xN) de-
notes [xT1, . . . , x
T
N]
T, and x−i denotes [xT1, . . . , x
T
i−1, x
T
i+1, . . . , x
T
N]
T.
Given a matrix A, vec(A) = [A1 . . . Al] with Ai being the ith
row of A. Given matrices A1, . . . , AN , blockdiag(A1, . . . , AN)
denotes the block diagonal matrix with Ai on the diagonal.
2. Game formulation and preliminaries
In this section, the formulation of the NE seeking problem
for a class of network games will be presented. Then, we give
some preliminaries on linear output regulation that will be used
in the subsequent sections. It is shown that any controller that
solves the output regulation problem of the reformulated agent
dynamics also solves the NE seeking problem.
2.1. Game formulation
Consider a game denoted by G(I, Ji,Ψi) played by N agents
having dynamics
x˙i = Ai(µi)xi + Bi(µi)ui + Pi(µi)wi,
yi = Ci(µi)xi, (1)
for each i ∈ I := {1, . . . ,N}, where wi ∈ Θi ⊆ Rqi is the dis-
turbance, xi ∈ Φi ⊆ Rni the state, ui ∈ Ωi ⊆ Rmi the input and
strategy vector, yi ∈ Ψi ⊆ Rpi the output and decision variable,
and denote µ ∈ Rni(ni+mi+qi+pi) as the uncertainty. The distur-
bance wi is generated by
w˙i = S iwi, (2)
where the initial value wi(0) ∈ Θi ⊆ Rqi with Θi being forward-
invariant. The uncertain matrices Ai(µi), Bi(µi), Pi(µi), and
Ci(µi), i ∈ I, are in the form of
Ai(µi) = Ai + ∆Ai, Bi(µi) = Bi + ∆Bi,
Pi(µi) = Pi + ∆Pi, Ci(µi) = Ci + ∆Ci,
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where Ai, Bi, Pi, Ci are the known nominal parts and
∆Ai, ∆Bi, ∆Pi, ∆Ci are the uncertain parts. The uncer-
tainty for each agent i, i ∈ I can be written as µi =
[vec(∆Ai) vec(∆Bi) vec(∆Pi) vec(∆Ci)]T.
Define Gc = (I,E) as the underlying communication graph
of the network where I is the index set as defined above and
E ⊂ I×I is the edge set. There is an edge between nodes i and
j if (i, j) ∈ E, i, j ∈ I. For an undirected graph, if (i, j) ∈ E then
( j, i) ∈ E. Denote the neighbor set of agent i as Ni ⊂ I. For
an undirected graph, if there exists a path between every pair of
nodes, the undirected graph is connected. A digraph is weakly
connected if there exists an undirected path between every pair
of nodes, and is strongly connected if there exists a directed
path between every pair of nodes.
Now, we give the definition of NE using outputs of (1) as de-
cision variables in the network game G(I, Ji,Ψi). In the game,
each agent tries to minimize a local cost function denoted by Ji,
i ∈ I.
Definition 1 (NE in network games). Given a network game
G(I, Ji,Ψi), the output y∗ := col(y∗1, . . . , y∗N) is an NE of G if
Ji(y∗i , y
∗
Ni ) ≤ Ji(yi, y∗Ni ).
Remark 2.1. (NE in network and general games) Definition 1
becomes the same as the definition of NE in general or aggrega-
tive games such as Koshal et al. (2016); Salehisadaghiani and
Pavel (2016); Deng and Liang (2019); De Persis and Gram-
matico (2019); Romano and Pavel (2019a) if Ri j , 0, Qi j , 0
for all i, j ∈ I, i.e., Gc is a complete graph.
The local cost function concerned in this work is defined as
Ji(yi, y−i) = yTi Riiyi + Qiiyi + qi +
∑
j∈I, j,i
(yTi Ri jy j + y
T
jQi jy j) (3)
where Rii ∈ Rpi×pi , Rii > 0 for i ∈ I, Qii ∈ R1×pi , qi ∈ R,
Ri j ∈ Rpi×p j , and Qi j ∈ Rp j×p j for i, j ∈ I, j , i. Denote the
neighbor set of agent i as Ni. Assume that Ri j , 0, Qi j , 0 for
j ∈ Ni, and Ri j = 0, Qi j = 0 otherwise. Then, the cost function
can also be written as Ji(yi, yNi ).
Note that since Rii > 0, for each i ∈ I, Ψi = Rpi and Φi =
Rni , the local cost function Ji is strictly convex and radially
unbounded in yi for all yNi ∈ ΨNi . Then according to Bas¸ar and
Olsder (1999, Corollary 4.2), there exists an NE for network
game G(I, Ji,Ψi).
Denote the partial gradient of cost function Ji as
∇iJi(yi, yNi ) = ( ∂Ji∂yi )T and the pseudo-gradient as F(y) =
col(∇1J1(y1, yN1 ), . . . ,∇N JN(yN , yNN )). Then, the pseudo-
gradient can be written as F(y) = R¯y + Q¯ where
R¯ =

R11 + RT11 R12 · · · R1N
R21 R22 + RT22 · · · R2N
...
...
. . .
...
RN1 RN2 · · · RNN + RTNN
 , Q¯ =

QT11
QT22
...
QTNN
 .
Assumption 2.1. The matrix R¯ is positive definite.
Following Facchinei and Pang (2003, Theorem 2.3.3), under
Assumption 2.1, the mapping F is strictly monotone, and the
game has a unique NE y∗ satisfying F(y∗) = R¯y∗ + Q¯ = 0.
Remark 2.2 (Monotonicity of F). Different assumptions on the
monotonicity of mapping F have been used in existing works
to guarantee the uniqueness of the NE. For example, for gen-
eral cost functions, Koshal et al. (2016); Salehisadaghiani and
Pavel (2016) assume the mapping to be strictly monotone, and
Deng and Liang (2019); De Persis and Grammatico (2019)
assume that the mapping is strongly monotone. Note that for
general cost functions, the assumption of strict monotonicity is
weaker than that of strong monotonicity. In this work, as the
cost function of each agent is in the linear quadratic form (3),
the strict monotonicity and the strong monotonicity of mapping
F are equivalent.
Another assumption is made to exclude the trivial case where
the disturbance wi for i ∈ I exponentially decays to 0.
Assumption 2.2. For each i ∈ I, S i has no eigenvalues with
negative real parts.
Now we give the formulation of the NE seeking problem for
the network game G.
Problem 1. Under Assumptions 2.1 to 2.2, for the network
game G(I, Ji,Ψi), use local partial gradient ei = ∇iJi(yi, yNi ),
i ∈ I to design strategy ui such that
(i) the closed-loop dynamics of all agents are stable, and
(ii) the output y := col(y1, . . . , yN) converge to the NE y∗ that
satisfies R¯y∗ + Q¯ = 0.
In the contrary to most existing works on NE seeking, the
solution of Problem 1 does not only need to drive the deci-
sion variables to the NE, but also guarantee the stability of the
closed-loop systems. This objective is similar to output reg-
ulation problems where the aim of the regulator is to achieve
reference tracking and/or disturbance rejection while guaran-
teeing that the closed-loop system is stable. In fact, we will get
inspirations from output regulation for game strategies design
in Section 3.
2.2. Preliminaries
First, we write the dynamics of all the agents in a stacked
form. Denote
w = col(w1, . . . ,wN), x = col(x1, . . . , xN),
u = col(u1, . . . , uN), µ = col(µ1, . . . , µN),
m¯ =
∑
i∈I mi, n¯ =
∑
i∈I ni, p¯ =
∑
i∈I pi, and q¯ =
∑
i∈I qi. Use the
pseudo-gradient as the regulated error, i.e., e = F(y) = R¯y + Q¯.
In order to write the regulated error e as a function of the
output y and an exogenous signal, we construct a linear exosys-
tem that consists of the disturbance generator (2) and a constant
component. Specifically, for i ∈ I, define vi = col(vi1, vi2) with
initial condition vi(0) = col(wi(0), 1) satisfying
v˙i = S˜ ivi =
[
S i 0
0 0
]
vi. (4)
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Then, the dynamics of the ith agent can be written as
x˙i = Ai(µi)xi + Bi(µi)ui + P˜i(µi)vi,
v˙i = S˜ ivi,
ei = F¯i(x, vi), (5)
where P˜i(µi) = [Pi(µi) 0]. The local regulated error ei is defined
as the local partial gradient described by
F¯i(x, vi) = (Rii + RTii)Ci(µi)xi +
∑
j∈N
Ri jC j(µi)x j + Q˜iivi (6)
with Q˜ii = [01×qi QTii].
Remark 2.3. (Extended exosystem) In exosystem (4), vi1 is the
same as wi in (2) and vi2 is constant 1. Then, we can use QTiivi2
to replace QTii in the expression of the local partial gradient ei.
It should be pointed out that, adding a constant component vi2
is necessary and does not complicate the strategy design. If (2)
already has a constant component, i.e. S i has an eigenvalue at
0, the addition of vi2 will not change the subsequent design of
the internal model. On the other hand, if S i has no eigenvalue at
0, it is necessary to take the constant vi2 into consideration. We
will show later that for the special case where the agents are not
subject to external disturbances, due to the constant vector Qii
in the cost function, the controller needs to contain an integra-
tor, which is the internal model for constant exogenous signals.
We denote (xi,ui) for each i ∈ I as the steady state of (5)
such that
0 = Ai(µi)xi + Bi(µi)ui + P˜i(µi)vi,
0 = F¯i(x, vi), (7)
and the corresponding steady-state output as yi = Ci(µi)xi
where x = col(x1, . . . , xN). Then, seeing ei as the local regu-
lated error, the distributed cooperative output regulation prob-
lem of (5) is to design a controller using ei such that (xi, ui)
converge to (xi,ui) for all i ∈ I. In fact, the solution to the co-
operative output regulation problem also solves the NE seeking
Problem 1.
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 2.1 to 2.2, if there exists
(xi,ui) such that (7) holds for all i ∈ I, the corresponding y =
col(y1, . . . , yN) is the NE of the network game G(I, Ji,Ψi).
Now, our aim is to design distributed controllers for cooper-
ative output regulation of (5). To this end, some standard as-
sumptions in the framework of linear output regulation will be
given first. In what follows, we denote
A¯(µ) = blockdiag(A1(µ1), . . . , AN(µN)),
B¯(µ) = blockdiag(B1(µ1), . . . , BN(µN)),
C¯(µ) = blockdiag(C1(µ1), . . . ,CN(µN)),
P¯(µ) = blockdiag(P˜1(µ1), . . . , P˜N(µN)),
Q̂ = blockdiag(Q˜11, . . . , Q˜NN).
Also, the nominal parts of A¯(µ), B¯(µ), C¯(µ), and P¯(µ) are de-
noted by A¯, B¯, C¯, and P¯, respectively.
Assumption 2.3. For each i ∈ I, (Ai, Bi) is stabilizable and
(Ai,Ci) is detectable.
Remark 2.4. (Overall network stabilizability and detectability)
As matrices Rii are positive definite for all i ∈ I, the detectabil-
ity of pair (Ai,Ci) is equivalent to the detectability of the pair
(Ai, (Rii + RTii)Ci). Moreover, since the dynamics of the agents
are decoupled, the pair (A¯, B¯) is stabilizable, (A¯, C¯) and (A¯, R¯C¯)
are detectable.
Assumption 2.4. For all λ ∈ spec(S i) ⋃{0}, i ∈ I,
rank
[
Ai − λI Bi
Ci 0
]
= ni + pi. (8)
Remark 2.5. (Existence of steady state) Assumption 2.4 guar-
antees the existence of the steady state (xi,ui) Huang (2004,
Theorem 1.9). The appendix presents some conditions guaran-
teed by Assumption 2.4 that will be used in subsequent sections.
To reject the disturbance generated by exosystem (4) and
handle the uncertainties in the agent dynamics, an internal
model is constructed for each agent i, i ∈ I. The following
is a general definition of an internal model given an exosystem
in the form w˙ = S w.
Definition 2 (Internal model). Huang (2004, Definition 1.25)
Given any square matrix S , a pair of matrices (M1,M2) incor-
porates a p-copy internal model of S if
M1 = V
[
T1 T2
0 G1
]
V−1, M2 = V
[
T3
G2
]
where (T1,T2,T3) are arbitrary constant matrices of any com-
patible dimensions, V is any nonsingular matrix with the same
dimension as M1 and
G1 = blockdiag(β1, . . . , βp), G2 = blockdiag(σ1, . . . , σp),
where βi are square matrices and σi are column vectors with
appropriate dimensions, (βi, σi) are controllable pairs, and the
characteristic polynomials of βi are the same as the minimal
polynomial of S for all i = 1, . . . , p.
Remark 2.6. By Definition 2, as a special case of (M1,M2),
the pair of (G1,G2) also incorporates a p-copy internal model
of matrix S .
Remark 2.7. (“p-copy” Internal model) Under Definition 2,
the dimension of the internal model is the dimension of the out-
put times the order of the minimal polynomial of S . The inter-
nal model design in Isidori et al. (2003) has the same dimension
but does not use the term “p-copy”.
3. Distributed game strategies
In this section, two distributed output feedback control strate-
gies are developed for the NE seeking problem. We first con-
sider the case where the agents are connected by a diagraph
without loops. Then, by letting the agents communicate more
information with their neighbors, we relax the assumption on
the information graph.
4
3.1. Directed communication graph
Using the internal model approach, a distributed error feed-
back strategy is designed in the form of
η˙i = Mi1ηi + Mi2ei,
ui = Kiηi, (9)
where ηi ∈ R(ni+pi si), Ki = [Ki1 Ki2] is the gain matrix,
Mi1 =
[
Ai + BiKi1 − Li(Rii + RTii)Ci BiKi2
0pi si×ni Gi1
]
, Mi2 =
[
Li
Gi2
]
,
si is the order of the minimal polynomial of S˜ i, Li is such that
Ai − Li(Rii + RTii)Ci is Hurwitz, and (Gi1,Gi2) incorporates a pi-
copy internal model of matrix S˜ i. By Definition 2, the pair
(Mi1,Mi2) also incorporates a pi-copy internal model of matrix
S˜ i.
Before presenting the main result, we make the following
assumption on the graph.
Assumption 3.1. The communication graph among the agents
is a digraph with no loop.
In most existing works on distributed NE seeking strategy
for games, for instance Salehisadaghiani and Pavel (2016); Ye
and Hu (2017); Gadjov and Pavel (2019); Deng and Liang
(2019); De Persis and Grammatico (2019); Romano and Pavel
(2019a), the network topology is assumed to be undirected and
connected. As far as we know, the strategies proposed in the
aforementioned works are not applicable to games with directed
communication graphs. However, it is noted that the controller
(9) cannot solve NE seeking problem with undirected commu-
nication graphs. A distributed strategy that is able to handle
both directed and undirected communication graphs will be
presented in the next subsection by allowing the neighboring
agents to exchange some additional information.
Remark 3.1. (State privacy in (9)) In controller (9), each agent
i, i ∈ I, exchanges output yi with its neighbors. Note that its
neighbors are not able to reconstruct the full state xi of agent
i only using this output. In the case where Ci , Ini and pi ,
ni, at least part of the agent state can remain private from its
neighbors.
Now we are ready to present the main result of this subsec-
tion.
Theorem 1 (Distributed strategy under communication di-
graphs). Under Assumptions 2.3, 2.4, and 3.1, the distributed
strategy (9) is a solution to the NE seeking Problem 1.
Proof. Denote zi = col(xi, ηi), and z = col(z1, . . . , zN). The
closed-loop system can be written as
z˙ = Ac(µ)z + Pc(µ)v,
v˙ = Ŝ v,
e = Cc(µ)z + Qcv (10)
where v = col(v1, . . . , vN) and Ŝ = blockdiag(S˜ 1, . . . , S˜ N). We
use Ac, Pc and Cc to denote the closed-loop system composed
of the nominal dynamics and the controller (9), where Ac is a
block matrix with diagonal blocks Aci and off diagonal blocks
Ei j, Cc is a block matrix with blocks C˜i j for i, j ∈ I, i , j,
Pc = P¯, Qc = Q̂ and
Aci =
 Ai BiKi1 BiKi2Li(Rii + RTii)Ci Ai + BiKi1 − Li(Rii + RTii)Ci BiKi2Gi2(Rii + RTii)Ci 0vi×ni Gi1
 ,
Ei j =
 0ni×n j 0ni×n j 0ni×v jLiRi jC j 0ni×n j 0ni×v jGi2Ri jC j 0vi×n j 0vi×v j
 ,
C˜i j =
[(Rii + RTii)Ci 0ni×ni 0ni×vi ], if i = j[Ri jC j 0ni×n j 0ni×v j ], otherwise.
According to Huang (2004, Theorem 1.31), under Assump-
tions 2.2 and 2.3, there exists a dynamic output feedback con-
troller in the form of (9) such that the closed-loop system is
stable and the error e converges to 0 asymptotically, if and only
if matrix Ac is Hurwitz, and the regulator equations
ZŜ = Ac(µ)Z + Pc(µ),
0 = Cc(µ)Z + Qc, (11)
have a unique solution Z for any µ in an open neighborhood of
µ = 0.
First, we examine the stability of the nominal matrix Ac. Un-
der Assumption 3.1, we can label the agents such that i < j if
(i, j) ∈ E for i, j ∈ I. Then, Ac becomes a block lower trian-
gular matrix. For each i ∈ I, the diagonal Aci is similar to the
matrix
A¯ci =
 Ai + BiKi1 BiKi1 BiKi20ni×ni Ai − Li(Rii + RTii)Ci 0ni×viGi2(Rii + RTii)Ci 0vi×ni Gi1
 .
Note that there exists Li for i ∈ I such that Ai − Li(Rii + RTii)Ci
is Hurwitz, as the pair (Ai, (Rii + RTii)Ci) is detectable. Under
Assumption 2.4 and by the definition of the internal model, we
have that for all λ ∈ spec(Gi1),
rank
[
Ai − λI Bi
(Rii + RTii)Ci 0pi×mi
]
= ni + pi. (12)
Then, according to Huang (2004, Lemma 1.26), under Assump-
tions 2.2 and 2.3, the pair( [ Ai 0ni×vi
Gi2(Rii + RTii)Ci Gi1
]
,
[
Bi
0vi×mi
] )
is stabilizable. Thus, there exists control gain [Ki1 Ki2] such
that[
Ai 0ni×vi
Gi2(Rii + RTii)Ci Gi1
]
+
[
Bi
0vi×mi
] [
Ki1 Ki2
]
=
[
Ai + BiKi1 BiKi2
Gi2(Rii + RTii)Ci Gi1
]
is Hurwitz. Then, for i ∈ I, A¯ci, and consequently Aci, are Hur-
witz, which shows the diagonal blocks of Ac are all Hurwitz.
As Ac is a block lower triangular matrix, it is also Hurwitz.
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Next, we show there exists a unique solution Z to the reg-
ulator equations (11). As Ac is Hurwitz, according to Huang
(2004, Lemma 1.27), the equations
XŜ = A¯X + B¯K¯Ξ + P¯,
ΞŜ = M¯1Ξ + M¯2(R¯C¯X + Q¯),
0 = R¯C¯X + Q¯ (13)
has a unique solution (X,Ξ) for any matrices P¯ and Q¯, where
K¯ = blockdiag(K1, . . . ,KN),
M¯1 = blockdiag(M11, . . . ,MN1),
M¯2 = blockdiag(M12, . . . ,MN2),
Note that the matrix equations (13) can be put into the form of
XcŜ = AcXc + Pc, 0 = CcXc + Qc, (14)
and the solvability of (14) means the solvability of regulator
equations (11) for any µ in any open neighborhood of µ = 0.
Therefore, by Huang (2004, Lemma 1.20), the distributed con-
troller (9) solves the output regulation problem. Then, follow-
ing Proposition 1, controller (9) also solves the NE seeking
Problem 1.
For the case where the agents are free of disturbances or sub-
ject to constant external disturbances, the exosystem (4) satis-
fies spec(S˜ i) = {0}. Then, the controller (9) can be simplified.
The distributed output feedback controller for disturbance-free
NE seeking problem can be derived directly from Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. Consider an NE seeking problem defined in Prob-
lem 1 with agent dynamics
x˙i = Ai(µi)xi + Bi(µi)ui,
yi = Ci(µi)xi, (15)
and cost functions (3) for all i ∈ I. Under Assumptions 2.3, 2.4
and 3.1, there exist matrices Li, Ki1 and Ki2, such that the NE
seeking problem has a solution in the form of (9) with
Mi1 =
[
Ai + BiKi1 − Li(Rii + RTii)Ci BiKi2
0pi×ni 0pi×pi
]
, Mi2 =
[
Li
Ipi
]
.
Remark 3.2. (Integrator in the strategy) When the agents are
not affected by external disturbances, we can design the pi-copy
internal model (Gi1,Gi2) as (0pi×pi , Ipi ) for each agent i, i ∈ I.
Note that in this case, it is still necessary to include an integra-
tor in the controller. This is because the steady-state output y
satisfying R¯y + Q¯ = 0 depends on the constant matrix Q¯. If
the agents have dynamics (1) and the disturbance wi is a con-
stant vector, the NE seeking strategy can use the same design
as shown in Corollary 1, as spec(S˜ i) = {0} still holds.
3.2. General communication graph
Assumption 3.1 can be relaxed if the distributed game strat-
egy is designed as
ξ˙i = Aiξi + Biui − Li(eˆi − ei),
ζ˙i = Gi1ζi + Gi2ei,
ui = Ki1ξi + Ki2ζi (16)
where eˆi = (Rii + RTii)Ciξi +
∑
j∈Ni Ri jC jξ j, matrix Li and the pair
(Gi1,Gi2) have the same definitions as in (9). The difference
between (16) and (9) is that in (16) agents exchange Ciξi with
neighbors. To rule out the case where the network contains iso-
lated agents solving an optimization problem instead of playing
games with neighbors, we have the following assumption on the
communication graph.
Assumption 3.2. The communication graph among the agents
is connected.
Under Assumption 3.2, the network topology can be a con-
nected undirected graph, or a weakly or strongly connected di-
graph.
Theorem 2 (Distributed strategy under connected communica-
tion graphs). Under Assumptions 2.3, 2.4, and 3.2, distributed
strategy (16) is a solution to the NE seeking Problem 1.
Proof. Denoting ξ = col(ξ1, . . . , ξN), ζ = col(ζ1, . . . , ζN), and
z = col(x, ξ, ζ) gives the system matrix of the nominal closed-
loop system as
Ac =
 A¯ B¯K¯1 B¯K¯2L¯R¯C¯ A¯ + B¯K¯1 − L¯R¯C¯ B¯K¯2G¯2R¯C¯ 0 G¯1
 .
Note that Ac here is in the same form as Aci in the proof of
Theorem 1. Therefore, under the assumption that R¯ is positive
definite, it can be proved in the same fashion that Ac is Hurwitz
and the regulator equations have a unique solution. Then, ap-
plying Huang (2004, Theorem 1.31), we can prove that there
exists a dynamic output feedback controller in the form of (16)
that stabilizes the closed-loop system and drives the error e to
zero asymptotically. Hence, following Proposition 1, (16) also
solves the NE seeking problem.
By allowing the agents to exchange the additional informa-
tion Ciξi with neighbors, we can relax the assumption on the
communication graph in Theorem 1. In (16), the ξi-subsystem
can be seen as an observer for the state xi and the ζi-subsystem
is the internal model for the exosystem (4). As the agents ex-
change Ciξi instead of full state estimation ξi, similar to the
arguments in Remark 3.1 the agents maintain some privacy.
Similar to the previous subsection, we can derive a corollary
for a disturbance-free NE seeking problem under general com-
munication graph from Theorem 2.
Corollary 2. Consider an NE seeking problem with agent dy-
namics (15) and cost functions (3) for all i ∈ I. Under Assump-
tions 2.3 and 2.4, there exists matrices Li, Ki1 and Ki2, such that
the NE seeking problem has a solution in the form of
ξ˙i = Aiξi + Biui − Li(eˆi − ei),
ζ˙i = ei,
ui = Ki1ξi + Ki2ζi. (17)
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Figure 1: The information graphs of the sensor networks.
4. Simulation results
In this section, the proposed NE seeking strategies are ap-
plied to connectivity control of sensor networks studied in
Stankovic´ et al. (2012). The network is composed of mobile
robot agents to be positioned at optimal sensing points while
keeping good connections with selected neighboring agents. In
this example, we consider mobile robots modelled by
x˙i1 = xi2, x˙i2 = −cixi2 + ui + wi, i ∈ I (18)
where xi1 and xi2 denote the position and velocity of each agent,
respectively, ci > 0 is the friction parameter. The decision vari-
able is the position of each agent, i.e., yi = xi1. The cost func-
tion is defined as
Ji = ‖yi − ri‖2 +
∑
j∈Ni
‖yi − y j‖2, (19)
for each i ∈ I, where ri is the objective position of each agent.
Then, by converging to the NE, the agents compromise between
the individual objective of moving to position ri and the collec-
tive objective of maintaining the connectivity with their neigh-
bors.
In the simulation, the sensor network is composed of 5 mo-
bile robots subject to disturbance generated by the exosystem
w˙i =
[
0 pi/10
−pi/10 0
]
wi, i ∈ I
which is a class of sinusoid signals having frequency pi/10. The
friction parameter is set as ci = 0.2. The initial positions of the
agents are (0, 0), (1, 1), (1,−1), (2, 1), (2,−1), respectively.
First, we consider a network connected by a digraph illus-
trated in (a) of Figure 1. The objective positions for the agents
are set at r1 = [−1 0]T, r2 = [1 −1]T, r3 = [2 −1]T, r4 = [−1 2]T,
and r5 = [−2 2]T. To keep connectivity with their neighbors, the
agents will converge to the NE y∗ = [−1 0 0 − 0.5 0.5 − 0.5 −
0.166 0.333 − 0.75 − 1.25]T. Applying the distributed strategy
(9) in Theorem 1, the robot agents can converge to the NE as
illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. In Figure 2, the initial positions
of the agents are denoted by circles and the NE is denoted by a
collection of crosses. Figure 3 illustrates the regulated errors ei
of the agents in x and y axes.
The second case is when the underlying graph of the agents is
undirected as illustrated in Figure 1(b). The objective positions
for the agents are set as the same in the previous case, and then
the NE becomes y∗ = [−0.459 − 0.133 0.204 − 0.527 0.580 −
0.130 − 0.071 0.449 − 0.709 − 1.064]T. The simulation results
of applying distributed strategy (16) to the NE seeking problem
are illustrated in Figures 4 and 5.
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Figure 2: Trajectories of the agents under digraph.
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Figure 3: Errors of the agents under digraph.
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Figure 4: Trajectories of the agents under undirected graph.
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Figure 5: Errors of the agents under undirected graph.
5. Conclusion
Motivated by engineering applications, this paper consid-
ers output NE seeking problems in a class of network games
with uncertain linear agent dynamics subject to external dis-
turbances. The main challenge is to design a strategy capa-
ble of both driving the agent outputs to the NE and stabilizing
the closed-loop dynamics. Other difficulties stem from the un-
certainties in the dynamics, the external disturbance, and the
relaxed assumptions on the communication graphs. By over
coming these difficulties, our proposed game strategies have a
wider range of applications to engineering multi-agent prob-
lems. Future work may consider similar output network games
with general cost functions and/or nonlinear agent dynamics.
6. Appendix
Some insights regarding Assumption 2.4
Under Assumption 2.4, it can be proved that for any nonsin-
gular matrix Di ∈ Rpi×pi and any λ ∈ spec(S i) ⋃{0},
rank
[
Ai − λI Bi
DiCi 0
]
= ni + pi.
To prove this, we denote
Hi =
[
Ai − λI Bi
Ci 0
]
, Fi =
[
Ini 0ni×pi
0pi×ni Di
]
.
Then, Fi ∈ R(ni+pi)×(ni+pi) is nonsingular, rank Fi = ni + pi,
Hi ∈ R(ni+pi)×(ni+pi), and
FiHi =
[
Ai − λI Bi
DiCi 0
]
.
By Bernstein (2009, Corollary 2.5.10), the following inequality
holds
rank Fi + rank Hi − (ni + pi) ≤ rank FiHi
≤ min{rank Fi, rank Hi},
which gives ni + pi ≤ rank FiHi ≤ ni + pi, and thus rank FiHi =
ni + pi.
Moreover, under Assumption 2.4, for all λ ∈ spec(S˜ ),
rank
[
A¯ − λI B¯
C¯ 0
]
= n¯ + p¯,
which leads to
rank
[
A¯ − λI B¯
R¯C¯ 0
]
= n¯ + p¯.
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